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If a tribunal determines that a state actor has expropriated
foreign investment property, or, under Chapter 11 of the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), that a state actor has
adopted a regulation that is "tantamount to" an expropriation of
foreign investment property,' then that tribunal must determine the
amount of compensation owed. International law has developed
methods to determine the size of a compensation award when a
state formally expropriates property. But the notion, reflected in
Chapter 11 of NAFTA, that states may be required to pay
compensation to foreign investors for what are, in effect,
regulatory takings, is barely in its infancy.2 Consequently, the
standards for determining the measure of compensation for
international regulatory takings are also extremely
underdeveloped. Valuation techniques that have been developed
in the context of formal expropriation may not translate readily to
regulations that leave possession undisturbed, but reduce the value
or profitability of property.
The most obvious source to look to for guidance in
determining the measure of compensation under international law
is domestic takings law. The largest and best-developed body of
such law is undoubtedly American constitutional law. The Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, which has been in
. John Paul Stevens Professor of Law, Northwestern University. This Article is
adapted from remarks originally given at the Colloquium on Regulatory
Expropriations in International Law sponsored by New York University School
of Law's Center on Environmental and Land Use Law and the New York
University Environmental Law Journal on April 26-27, 2002.
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, art. 1110(1), 32
I.L.M. 612, 641 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2 See Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, Award (ICSID (Additional
Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Aug. 30, 2000), 16 ICSID REV. - FOREIGN
INV. L.J. 168 (2001), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/
metalcladCorp-en.asp. I will not here enter into the debate about whether
NAFTA's "tantamount to" expropriation language is properly interpreted as
prohibiting regulatory takings, but will proceed on the assumption that this
reading is correct.
INCOMPLETE COMPENSATION FOR TAKINGS
effect for over 200 years, requires the payment of "just
compensation" for takings of property. 3 For the last eighty of
those years, it has been established that regulations may, in certain
circumstances, impair property values so severely as to constitute a
taking.4  When one examines American compensation law,
however, one finds that here too there is little guidance about how
to measure just compensation in regulatory takings cases. At most,
American law suggests some plausible models that can be adapted
to the regulatory takings context.
There is, however, a more general lesson to be drawn from
American law that may shed light on this topic. The most striking
feature of American compensation law-even in the context of
formal condemnations or expropriations-is that just
compensation means incomplete compensation. Compensation is
strictly limited to what in contract law would be called "general
damages"-the fair market value of the property taken. Other
consequential damages incurred by the property owner are
ignored. Similarly, any increment in value that reflects a gain to
the taker, which might be recoverable between private parties in an
action for restitution or unjust enrichment, is ignored. This strict
limitation to general damages results in an award that is lower than
what one would obtain under either an indemnification standard
that includes consequential damages or a restitution standard.
Part IV of this Article considers several possible justifications
for this rule of incomplete compensation for takings, namely, loss
spreading, maintaining efficient incentives for property owners,
and providing subsidies for public goods. It also considers briefly
whether these justifications carry over into the international
regulatory takings context. Before doing so, however, this Article
will briefly review what international law and NAFTA tell us
about the measure of just compensation, and the basic tenets of
American constitutional law on the subject. These are the subjects
of Parts I and II respectively. Following this discussion, Part III
considers models that tribunals might adopt or borrow from
American law in order to set compensation awards in regulatory
takings cases.
3 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.").
4 The foundational decision is Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).
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I
THE MEASURE OF COMPENSATION UNDER INTERNATIONAL
CUSTOMARY LAW AND NAFTA
When a nation-state expropriates property that is owned by a
national of another state, general principles of customary
international law require that the expropriating state pay the owner
"just compensation." 5  As to what compensation is just, the
authorities are somewhat equivocal. The American view, going
back to diplomatic notes exchanged between Secretary of State
Cordell Hull and the Mexican Ambassador to the United States
regarding expropriation of American-owned land and oil rights
during the Mexican Revolution of 1910-1920, has been that just
compensation means "prompt, adequate and effective payment."
6
"Prompt" means that the payment must occur at the time of the
taking, or must include interest from the time of the taking to the
time of payment. "Adequate" means that the compensation must
equal the "fair market value" of the property taken. And
"effective" means that the payment must be in an established
international currency or in a currency freely exchangeable into
such a currency and eligible for repatriation.7
However, actual international practice, as reflected in
arbitration decisions in the post-World War II era, is considerably
more mixed. Often payment occurs some time after the
expropriation takes place, falls short of fair market value, or is
made in a currency subject to exchange controls or other
limitations on repatriation. 8  As a consequence, the customary
international law norm is a good deal more qualified than the
"prompt, adequate, and effective" standard historically endorsed
by the United States.
Whatever uncertainties inhere in customary international law,
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 712 (1986). For an overview and bibliography, see Rosalyn
Higgins, The Taking of Property by the State: Recent Developments in
International Law, 176 RECUEIL DES COURS 259 (1982).
6 See Tali Levy, Note, NAFTA 's Provision for Compensation in the Event of
Expropriation: A Reassessment of the "Prompt, Adequate and Effective"
Standard, 31 STAN. J. INT'L L. 423, 430 (1995).
7 See Frank G. Dawson and Bums H. Weston, "Prompt, Adequate and
Effective ". A Universal Standard of Compensation?, 30 FORDHAM L. REv. 727,
736-40 (1962).
8 See generally id. (noting that, in practice, owners of expropriated property
have been forced to accept delayed, partial, and in-kind compensation).
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the expropriation provisions in Chapter 11 of NAFTA fully
embrace the American view of what constitutes just
compensation. 9 NAFTA requires the signatory states to pay
"compensation" for any measure that expropriates or is tantamount
to expropriation of an investment of an investor of another
signatory state. 10 The term "compensation" is in turn given a
specific definition:
[c]ompensafion shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the
expropriation took place ("date of expropriation"), and shall not
reflect any change in value occurring because the intended
expropriation had become known earlier. Valuation criteria
shall include going concern value, asset value including
declared tax value of tangible property, and other criteria, as
appropriate, to determine fair market value."l
Although this definition does not mention the word
"adequate," that term has long been understood to mean fair
market value, 12 which NAFTA unequivocally requires. Additional
provisions of Chapter 11 stipulate that the compensation be paid
"without delay"'13 and with "interest ... at a commercially
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation;"' 4 that the
compensation be paid in G7 currency or, if in another currency, in
an amount reflecting the value in G7 currency at exchange rates
prevailing on the date of payment;' 5 and that the payment of
compensation be "freely transferable."' 6 Thus, NAFTA embodies
each of the lodestars of the traditional American view of
international law: the compensation must be prompt, adequate
(that is, equivalent to fair market value), and effective.
Customary international law also provides, at best, incomplete
guidance as to how "fair market value" is to be determined.
Where a state takes possession of an enterprise, as through
nationalization, two techniques for ascertaining fair market value
9 See Levy, supra note 6, at 441-43.
10 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1), 32 I.L.M. at 641.
" Id. art. 1110(2), at 641-42.
12 See Henry T.C. Hu, Compensation in Expropriations: A Preliminary
Economic Analysis, 20 VA. J. INT'L L. 61, 64-65 (1979).
" NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(3), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
14 Id.art. 1110(4), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
"5 Id. art. 1110(5), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
16 Id. art. 1110(6), 32 I.L.M. at 642.
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are "net book value" and "going concern value., 17 The former is a
backward-looking approach that is based on the historical prices of
assets (preferably adjusted for inflation), less liabilities and
depreciation.18 The latter is a forward-looking approach that relies
upon an estimate of what future earnings would have been absent
the expropriation, discounted to present value (preferably using a
discount rate adjusted to reflect the risk of the enterprise). 19 Other
measures of value have been advocated and applied as well.20 The
most thorough multi-volume examination of the issue concludes
ruefully that international law affords no precise rule or specific
formula that can be applied across the board.21
NAFTA goes part of the way toward providing greater
clarification as to how a tribunal is to go about determining fair
market value. The NAFTA Chapter 11 definition of compensation
provides that "[v]aluation criteria shall include going concern
value, asset value including declared tax value of tangible
property, and other criteria, as appropriate, to determine fair
market value., 22 Merely by endorsing the use of going concern
value, NAFTA provides a significant measure of guidance. Going
concern value, generally understood to refer to a discounted cash
flow analysis, is typically larger than net book value and would
presumably be the method favored by owners of investment
property, as opposed to net book value, which would more often
be preferred by expropriating governments. 23  NAFTA also
resolves a longstanding uncertainty by providing that "declared tax
'7 See Richard B. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property by the
Foreign Claims Settlement Commission, in 1 THE VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED
PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 95, 106-115 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1972)
[hereinafter VALUATION VOL. 1]; see generally Haliburton Fales, A Comparison
of Compensation for Nationalization of Alien Property with Standards of
Compensation Under United States Domestic Law, 5 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 871
(1983) (discussing various standards of valuation in international law).
18 See Thomas R. Stauffer, Valuation of Assets in International Takings, 17
ENERGY L.J. 459, 461 (1996).
19 See id at 461-62.
20 See, e.g., Gillian White, The Problems of Valuation in the Barcelona
Traction Case, in VALUATION VOL. 1, supra note 17, at 57.
21 See generally Richard B. Lillich, The Valuation of Nationalized Property
in International Law: Toward a Consensus or More "Rich Chaos"?, in 3 THE
VALUATION OF NATIONALIZED PROPERTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 183 (Richard
B. Lillich ed., 1975) [hereinafter VALUATION VOL. 3] (describing the lack of any
common international standard of compensation assessment).
2 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2), 32 I.L.M. at 641-42.
23 Stauffer, supra note 18, at 462.
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value" can be utilized in fixing asset values.24 This provides a kind
of floor on compensation, by estopping the expropriating
government from arguing for any value lower than the one used
prior to expropriation for setting taxes on the property. Finally,
NAFTA rules out any reduction in compensation caused by a
depression in fair market value caused by rumors of impending
expropriation; in America, this is known as an "erosion taking."
To be sure, these clarifications are partially nullified by the final
language of the definition allowing the tribunal to use "other
criteria, as appropriate," without saying what is or is not
"appropriate" in the way of such "criteria."
When we turn from cases involving expropriation in the
classic sense (where the government takes possession of property)
to regulatory takings, we find no guidance at all in international
law as to how to measure just compensation. This no doubt
reflects the fact that regulatory takings have not received the same
unequivocal condemnation in international law that formal
expropriations have. NAFTA likewise provides no help here. Its
specification of "valuation criteria," which refers to measures like
going concern value and declared tax value, is clearly tailored to
formal expropriation, where the government acquires full
possession of the property. These measures are less relevant to
regulatory takings, where the government does not acquire
possession of the property, but merely impairs its value.
II
FAIR MARKET VALUE IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
NAFTA's basic directive about the measure of compensation,
applicable both to formal expropriations and regulatory takings, is
that "[c]ompensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of
the expropriated investment immediately before the expropriation
took place." 25 This is a restatement of the most basic axiom of
26American constitutional law of compensation. Thus, one
24 Compare NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2), 32 I.L.M. at 641-42, with
Roger P. Smith, Real Property Valuation for Foreign- Wealth Deprivations, in
VALUATION VOL. 1, supra note 17, at 152-54 (discussing the controversy
surrounding the use of tax assessments to value real property).
25 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(2), 32 I.L.M. at 641.
26 See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511
(1979); United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923).
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obvious step to take in seeking further to particularize the NAFTA
standard is to look to established legal principles and valuation
practices under American law.
27
American constitutional law has long held that an owner of
property taken by the government is entitled to the "fair market
value" of the property determined as of the time it is taken.28 Fair
market value, in turn, has been defined to mean the amount that a
willing buyer would pay a willing seller of the property, taking
into account all possible uses to which the property might be put
other than the use contemplated by the taker.29
All of this sounds straightforward, but as astute observers
have long recognized, the concept of fair market value is
essentially a fiction in the context of takings of property. Fair
market value would perhaps be more easily ascertainable if takings
took place in thick markets in which there were many buyers and
sellers. If the government, for example, were to take a tanker of
oil, one could look to the price of oil prevailing in the relevant
market on the date of the taking in order to fix its fair market
value. In practice, however, government condemnations occur
almost exclusively in thin markets, where there is only one seller
who has a monopoly over some resource needed for a public
project. Takings are forced exchanges of unique property rights,
typically rights in land, that occur in circumstances where
voluntary exchange has failed and there are no good substitutes for
the land in question insofar as the condemning authority is
concerned.30 In this context, there is no market and hence no "fair
market value."
How do courts determine the fair market value of an asset for
which there is no market price? The answer is that the value is
fixed based on an opinion or educated guess about what the
For an overview of American law of just compensation, see DAVID A. DANA &
THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY: TAKINGS 169-90 (2002).
2' This strategy has been exploited by others in seeking to fill out the content
of international law. See Smith, supra note 24, at 142-65 (developing a synthesis
of American, Canadian, and British domestic law practices to give content to the
intentional law standard of just compensation for nationalizations of property).
28 See DANA & MERRILL, supra note 26, at 169.
29 See United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374-75 (1943); 4 JULIus L.
SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.02[1], at 12-60 to 12-67 (rev. 3d
ed. 2002).
30 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L.
REV. 61, 77-79 (1986).
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negotiated price of the property would have been if, contrary to
fact, the owner had sought to sell it and a willing buyer had sought
to buy it on the day of the taking. This opinion or educated guess
about price is developed by using various valuation techniques
similar to those used in appraising property in other non-market
contexts, such as establishing tax values, determining a distribution
of assets to stakeholders upon partition or dissolution of a business
entity, or listing property for sale. The four most common
techniques recognized in American compensation law are:
(1) examination of recent sales prices for the property in question;
(2) examination of recent sales prices for other properties in the
area deemed to be comparable to the property in question;
(3) capitalization of the actual or potential rental value of the
property in question; and (4) calculation of the cost of rebuilding
the property minus depreciation to reflect its age and wear and
tear.3' Different jurisdictions have different rules about which
techniques are most preferred, and often the determination of
which approach to use is left to the discretion of the tribunal,
depending on the circumstances of the case.
What actually happens in a case in which there is a dispute
about the measure of compensation? Basically, the condemning
authority introduces evidence, often through the testimony of
expert witnesses, which follows one or more of the foregoing
valuation techniques, and tends to show that the property has a
relatively low value. The owner then introduces evidence, often
using rival expert witnesses, which follows one or more of these
techniques and tends to show that the property has a relatively high
value. The tribunal, which may include a jury depending on the
jurisdiction, will then have to determine which evidence is most
persuasive. Sometimes, it will accept the valuation submitted by
one party or the other; often, it will reach a compromise between
the positions of the two parties. The number picked by the tribunal
is deemed to be the "fair market value" of the property and
becomes the measure of just compensation which the taker must
pay to the owner, along with interest from the date of the taking.
Fair market value is not the only standard that could be
adopted to implement the just compensation requirement.32 One
3' 4 SACKMAN, supra note 29, § 12.02[1], at 12-72; see also 1 LEWIS ORGEL,
VALUATION UNDER THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN §§ 136-138 (James C.
Bonbright, ed., 2d ed. 1953); 2 id., §§ 188-189.
32 See Smith, supra note 24, at 141 (noting two alternative standards, "value
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alternative would be to set compensation equal to the benefit
received by the taker from acquiring the property. 33  This
restitution or unjust enrichment standard would generally result in
higher awards of compensation than the fair market value standard.
This is because condemnations of land typically increase the value
of the property taken on a dollar-per-square-foot basis. The taking
is often part of a project to assemble many contiguous parcels of
land, which have a higher unit value after assembly than they
previously did.34 Alternatively, the property may have some other
strategic value that makes it especially valuable to the taker. Even
in regulatory takings cases, the value of the property to society at
large should be higher in its regulated state than it will be in its
unregulated state-at least this will be true if the regulatory system
is functioning properly. Under established rules for determining
just compensation, however, compensation is based on the highest
and best use of the property other than the use contemplated by the
taker.35 Thus, the increment in value created by the taking goes to
the taker (or society at large) rather than the owner.
Another alternative to fair market value would be to set
compensation based on the loss to the owner. Such an
indemnification standard would also generally result in higher
awards of compensation relative to fair market value. 36 The most
striking deviation between the fair market value standard and an
indemnification standard involves consequential damages. The
American fair market value test ignores all consequential damages
associated with condemnation, such as lost future profits, lost
business goodwill associated with the location of the property,
moving expenses, and attorneys fees. 37  A standard of
indemnification presumably would require compensating owners
to the taker" and "value to the owner").
33 Id.
" See Merrill, supra note 30, at 98 tbl. 1 (presenting a table summarizing the
reasons why condemning authorities use eminent domain, with land assembly
being the most common).
See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 261 (1946).
36 Language in some decisions suggests an indemnification standard. See,
e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 (1970) ("The owner is to be put
in the same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had
not been taken."). But there is no indication that the Court, in making these
statements, was qualifying or repudiating the fair market value standard.
3' See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946).
As noted below, some types of consequential damages are compensated in partial
takings cases.
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for these sorts of damages.
Perhaps even more importantly, the fair market value standard
ignores all subjective value that the owner attaches to her property
above and beyond the market's valuation. There are numerous
reasons why owners may subjectively value their property more
than the market does, ranging from psychological attachment to
the property, to features of the property that have been customized
to the owner's tastes, to nontransferable benefits associated with
the location, to a desire to avoid the hassles of moving. We know
subjective value is usually positive if for no other reason than that
an owner who values the property at less than its fair market value
will generally sell it. Conversely, if an owner has not sold the
property, it is likely that the owner has a subjective value higher
than market value.
An indemnification standard would result in a lower award
than fair market value only in those relatively rare cases where an
owner obtains some offsetting benefit from the taking. This may
include enhanced value to an unrelated parcel of property, which
might be taken into account in determining what compensation is
required in order to make the owner whole. This is the one area
where the market value standard works to the advantage of the
owner-offsetting benefits to the owner are also disregarded under
the fair market value test.38
Why American constitutional law has adopted what is in
effect an incomplete measure of compensation-at least relative to
other possible measures of compensation-is left largely
unexplained by the leading decisions and treatises on the topic.
This issue is revisited in Part IV.
In summary, "fair market value," as understood in American
constitutional law, is an impersonal standard of compensation, but
not an objective one. It is impersonal in the sense that it abstracts
away from elements of value that are personal to a given owner of
property-whether it be the private owner before the taking occurs
or the public owner afterwards. But this does not mean that fair
market value is an objective standard, in the sense that one can
look up the value in some register of prices. Fair market value
usually must be constructed inferentially from other evidence, and
38 See, e.g., United States v. Miller,. 317 U.S. 369, 376-77 (1943). As noted
below, offsetting benefits are taken into account in many jurisdictions in partial
taking cases. See, e.g., id. at 376.
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hence necessarily entails an element of discretionary choice. This
exercise of discretion is constrained primarily by conventions
regarding permissible valuation techniques. These conventions, in
turn, are not universal, but vary significantly by time and place.
International law, no doubt, should consider the conventions
recognized by domestic law in determining how to measure fair
market value. 39 But there is no single right answer as to which
conventions are preferred in which circumstances. International
law conventions of valuation will have to be developed over time,
in light of accumulated experience.
III
AMERICAN MODELS FOR DETERMINING COMPENSATION FOR
REGULATORY TAKINGS
Nearly all the applicable precedent in American law on the
determination of just compensation has been developed in the
context of exercises of traditional eminent domain authority,
analogous to formal expropriations in international law. American
compensation law provides very little guidance about how to
determine compensation in regulatory takings cases.40 The reason
for this paucity of authority is that, to date, relatively few
regulatory takings cases have been litigated to a final judgment
awarding compensation. Regulatory takings claims are subject to
a variety of exhaustion requirements, 41 which often have the effect
of wearing down the claimant, or, if the claimant persists, inducing
a settlement. In those cases where courts reach the merits, the
substantive law tends to favor the government, 42 meaning that only
a fraction of claims result in any finding of liability. Even if a
court finds that a regulation constitutes a regulatory taking, the
3' For a starting point in considering how this might be done, see Smith,
supra note 24, at 142-64.
40 For a recent exception to this generalization, see 520 East 81st Street
Associates v. New York, 2002 N.Y. LEXIS 3459 (Nov. 14, 2002) (resolving
issues about the measurement of just compensation in the context of a regulatory
taking).
41 See, e.g., Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank
of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 185-97 (1985). For an overview of the
procedural obstacles to litigating a takings claim, see DANA & MERRILL, supra
note 26, at 254-73.
4' For an overview of the various doctrines of regulatory takings law, see
DANA & MERRILL, supra note 26, at 86-168.
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government can respond in a variety of ways, including dropping
or modifying the regulation, which may eliminate the need to
determine just compensation.43 Consequently, if one looks to
American constitutional law for guidance as to how to determine
just compensation in an international regulatory takings case, it
will be necessary to extrapolate from other features of American
law originally designed for other purposes.
A. The Partial Takings Model.
One model that could be used to determine the measure of just
compensation in regulatory takings cases would be based on the
rules that apply in cases of partial takings. Many (perhaps most)
condemnations are partial takings; that is, the taker acquires only a
fraction of the owner's property and leaves the balance in the
owner's hands. This will often occur, for example, when the
taking is for a highway or a utility right-of-way. Regulatory
takings are nearly always partial takings, in the sense that the
regulation does not reduce the fair market value of the property to
zero, but leaves some positive increment in value, although less
than the value of the property without the regulation. Hence, we
could attempt to derive the measure of compensation in regulatory
takings cases by treating regulatory takings like partial takings.
The American rules for computing fair market value in partial
takings cases differ somewhat from those applied in total takings
cases. In a partial taking, the owner is awarded not only the fair
market value of the part that is taken, but also damages for loss in
value to the part that is not taken. 4 These are sometimes referred
to as "residuum damages." In addition, states are permitted (but
not required) to reduce the award of compensation in partial
takings by taking into account offsetting benefits to the part of the
43 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304, 321 (1987). First English also establishes that the government
may have to pay compensation for a "temporary taking" during the time the
regulation remains in effect. Id. at 322. But the Supreme Court has recently
ruled that whether or not regulations subsequently rescinded constitute a
temporary taking is governed by the ad hoc balancing approach associated with
Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); such
regulations will not be presumed to be per se takings even if they prohibit all
developmental uses of the land. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
44 See Bauman v. Ross, 167 U.S. 548, 574 (1897); 4A SACKMAN, supra note
29, § 14A.01[2], at 14A-4.
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property that is not taken.45 These can be called residuum benefits.
The combined effect of these rules is that the compensation
standard for partial takings shifts part way toward an
indemnification standard. The law does not shift all the way to full
indemnification, because consequential damages, such as lost
profits and goodwill and attorneys fees, continue to be
uncompensated in the partial takings situation. What the law does
in the partial takings situation, in effect, is to compute the fair
market value of what the owner has before the taking, then
compute the fair market value of what the owner has after the
taking, and award the owner the difference.46 The partial takings
rules can thus be seen as a variant on the fair market value
approach, with the twist that one does not seek the fair market
value of what is acquired by the government (the usual rule), but
rather the fair market value of what is taken from the owner. This
twist, in effect, shifts the compensation standard part way toward
an indemnification standard.
The rationale for shifting part way toward an indemnification
standard in partial takings cases has never been clearly spelled out.
One possible explanation is that the indemnification standard is
inherently preferable, but courts are constrained from adopting it in
the total takings context by high administrative costs. If one were
to engage in an analysis of residuum damages and residuum
benefits in the total takings context, it is not clear what property
one would use as a baseline in undertaking this analysis. Without
any clear line to demarcate the inquiry, it could mushroom into an
open-ended set of arguments and counter-arguments that would
magnify administrative costs several times over. In partial takings
cases, by contrast, the inquiry into residuum damages and
residuum benefits is carefully confined to damages and benefits to
the part of the owner's property that remains after the taking.
Another possible explanation is that partial takings are
especially prone to unfair outcomes under the fair market value
45 See 3 SACKMAN, supra note 29, § 8A.03[2], at 8A-58 to 8A-60.
46 See, e.g., United States v. 8.41 Acres of Land, 680 F.2d 388, 392-94 (5th
Cir. 1982). Some courts do not proceed this way, but rather ask the trier of fact
to find the fair market value of the interest acquired by the government, and then
make adjustments for damages to the part that remains and offsetting benefits to
the part that remains. But the before-and-after comparison is the "simplest and
perhaps the most widely used approach in severance damage determinations."
Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 328, 336 (Ct. Cl. 1980).
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standard. Consider, for example, a partial taking that leaves the
owner landlocked. This could effectively reduce the value of the
residual property to zero, but there would be no compensation for
this loss under a standard that awards only the fair market value of
what the government has acquired. Alternatively, consider a
partial taking that puts a public street through to land that was
previously landlocked. Here, the taking transforms land that was
previously worth very little into a valuable asset, yet under the fair
market value standard, the government would be required to pay
some compensation to the owner, even though he has already
received a substantial windfall. Shifting to a rule that awards the
fair market value of what is taken eliminates both of these extreme
outcomes.
A final possible explanation is that partial takings, unlike total
takings, interfere with the scale of the owner's unit of property,
thereby generating an additional type of cost that the government
needs to take into account in structuring its takings. Suppose, for
example, that A owns a city lot and the government wants to take
eighty percent of the lot for a new street. Under ordinary rules, the
government would pay the fair market value of what it acquires-
eighty percent of the lot. It is not unlikely, however, that the
twenty percent that remains after the taking will be too small to
build on, and hence has been rendered largely worthless. Limiting
the government to paying for the eighty percent of the lot that it
acquires would thus create an external cost to the owner that the
government would have no incentive to take into account. The
result might be that takers would have an incentive to act
strategically to structure their takings as partial takings in order to
leave owners with uncompensated losses. Whatever the
explanation, partial takings present an important, albeit limited,
exception to the general rule that the government pays the fair
market value of the interest it acquires. In this context, the
government pays the fair market value of what the owner loses.
The partial takings rules could be adopted for determining just
compensation in regulatory takings cases. In effect, the tribunal
would take a snapshot of fair market value of the property before
the regulatory taking, and a snapshot of fair market value after the
regulatory taking, and would award the difference to the owner.47
47 This is essentially the approach recently endorsed by the New York Court
of Appeals. See 520 East 81 st Street Associates v. New York, 2002 N.Y. LEXIS
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The difference in fair market value before and after would, in
effect, represent the capitalized (negative) value of the regulatory
restriction which has, by hypothesis, been determined by the
tribunal to be a regulatory taking.
B. The Public Utility Model
A second possible model from American law that could, be
adopted for determining just compensation in regulatory takings
cases is the approach followed in public utility cases. It has long
been established that regulatory ceilings on rates and charges of
public utilities are subject to review under the Takings Clause.48
The public utility cases also present a situation similar to that
present in regulatory takings, in the sense that the government has
not taken title to property nor has it deprived the owner of
possession. Rather, the government has imposed a system of
regulation on the property that restricts the freedom of the owner
to determine its use or to set prices for its use, thereby impairing
the value of the property.
In the public utility cases, a variation on the fair market value
standard is used-the fair return on investment standard.
Conceptually, the fair return standard operates in a manner similar
to the fair market value standard-the objective is to determine
just compensation based on benchmarks that reflect the behavior
of other actors in the relevant market. In public utility cases, one
key understanding is that the regulated firm is entitled to recover
only its reasonable costs of providing the service in question.
Inflated costs and padded expenses are disallowed.49 It is assumed
that, if the firm were operating in a competitive environment, it
would be able to recover from consumers only reasonable costs;
any attempt to charge for excessive costs would result in loss of
business to competitors. Another key understanding is that the
regulated firm is entitled to earn a rate of return on investment
comparable to the return that investors expect to receive before
3459 (Nov. 14, 2002) (adopting the before and after market value test and
awarding interest on the difference from the date of the regulatory taking).
" See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467 (2002);
Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
49 See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 547 (1898) ("[W]hat the public is
entitled to demand is that no more be exacted from it for the use of a public
highway than the services rendered by it are reasonably worth.").
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committing funds to investments having commensurate risks. 50 In
a competitive market, the firm would be able to attract investment
capital only if it were able to provide a return at least as high as
investors require before committing funds to other investments of
similar risk.
The task of the regulatory agency, or the court under the
public utility model, therefore, is twofold. First, it must scrutinize
all costs incurred by the regulated firm in order to determine
whether they satisfy the standard of reasonableness. Second, it
must estimate the return on investment that would be generated
under a proposed rate order and compare this to the market rate of
return for investments of comparable risk.51 If the proposed order
fails to provide for recovery of all reasonable costs or if it provides
a return on investments that falls below the market rate of return,
then the just compensation standard requires that the regulatory
agency provide a rate increase or otherwise eliminate the gap in
order to avoid an unconstitutional outcome.
In practice, courts give regulatory agencies broad discretion in
determining what constitutes a fair return on public utility
investment. For example, the Supreme Court has said that
regulators are free to value investment property using either a book
value method or a replacement cost method.52 The Court has also
permitted regulators to impose rates on certain services below cost,
so long as the total effect of the regulatory regime permits a fair
return on investment. 53  The constitutional standard, however,
lurks in the background and has played an important role in
structuring the inquiry that occurs in public utility rate cases.
The approach followed in the public utility cases could also
be applied to regulatory takings issues, such as those presented by
strict environmental or land use controls. The general task would
'0 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314 ("One of the elements always relevant to
setting the rate under ... is the return investors expect given the risk of the
enterprise.").
51 See generally A. Lawrence Kolbe & William B. Tye, The Fair Allowed
Rate of Return with Regulatory Risk, in 15 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS
129 (Richard 0. Zerbe, Jr. & Victor P. Goldberg eds., 1992) (discussing the
problem of estimating target allowed rates of return on equity for investments in
regulated utilities given assymetric regulatory risks).
52 See Verizon, 535 U.S. 467 (holding that the use of the term "cost" in
ratesetting legislation implies broad methodological leeway).
53 See Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 312; Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United
States, 345 U.S. 146, 148 (1953).
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be to develop a model of what an otherwise identical firm that
incurred only reasonable costs would expect to earn as a return on
investment in a competitive environment. The tribunal would then
calculate the expected return on investment of the firm subject to
the regulatory taking, after making adjustments to eliminate any
unreasonable costs the firm may be incurring. If the impact of the
control measure would drive the return on investment below the
benchmark fair rate of return, the government, as in the public
utility cases, would be required to provide compensation sufficient
to close the gap between the anticipated rate of return and the
benchmark rate of return. The amount of compensation, as under
the partial takings methodology, should, in theory, represent the
capitalized (negative) value of the regulatory restriction which has,
by hypothesis, been determined by the tribunal to be a regulatory
taking.
C. Integrating the Approaches into International Law
Each of the two proposed approaches to determining
compensation for regulatory takings has a natural affinity with one
of the two principal methods of determining just compensation
under existing customary international law-the net book value
method and the going concern value method. The partial takings
model is a variant on the net book value approach with the
difference being that, under the partial takings model, one
determines net book value twice-before and after the regulation
takes effect. Just compensation is equal to the difference between
the two values. The public utility model is analogous to the going
concern value or discounted cash flow approach, with the twist
that now, under the public utility model, one calculates the going
concern value twice-once for a hypothetical investment of
equivalent risk and again for the actual investment as subject to the
regulatory restriction. Just compensation is equal to the difference
between the two values. The parallelism between the two
suggested models and the two established tests for measuring
compensation in expropriation cases suggests that either of these
models could be integrated into international law without too much
difficulty.
This does not mean, however, that the two models would
yield identical results.54 In particular, each model adopts a
54 Cf Stauffer, supra note 18, at 470-71, 485-88 (arguing for a "congruence
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different baseline for determining the amount of compensation due
because of a regulatory taking. The partial'taking model adopts as
a baseline the financial status quo ante of the firm prior to the
imposition of the offending regulation. Compensation is designed
to make this entity whole, in the sense of restoring it to the
financial condition that it enjoyed before the regulation took effect.
The public utility model, in contrast, adopts as a baseline the
financial condition of a hypothetical firm operating in a
competitive environment, but otherwise subject to comparable
risk, prior to the imposition of the offending regulation.
Compensation here is not designed to restore the firm to the status
quo ante, but rather to restore it to the situation that would exist in
a competitive market in which the firm recovers only its
reasonable costs and earns only a reasonable (that is, risk-adjusted)
rate of return on investment.
This contrast suggests that the two models should be deployed
in different circumstances. The partial takings model makes most
sense in circumstances where the firm that has suffered the
regulatory taking is operating in a competitive environment when
the taking occurred, making it likely that its cost structure has been
constrained by the forces of competition. This might be the case,
for example, where the firm competes in a national or international
market, but the regulatory taking has been imposed by a local unit
of government that has jurisdiction over only this firm and not
others. The public utility model makes more sense in
circumstances in which the firm operates in a monopoly or
oligopolistic market and there is reason to question whether its cost
structure has been constrained by effective competition. In these
circumstances, awarding compensation equal to the difference
between fair market value before and after the taking has the effect
of locking in any wasteful or padded costs that were present before
the taking and implicitly treats them as an entitlement.55 It is also
plausible to assume the partial takings approach, with its simple
before-and-after snapshot approach, would generally entail lower
administrative costs than the public utility approach, which
requires a review of the reasonableness of costs and the
principle" under which the two methods are close proxies for each other when
net book value is adjusted for inflation and accounting conventions).
55 See William J. Baumol & Thomas W. Merrill, Does the Constitution
Require That We Kill the Competitve Goose? Pricing Local Phone Services to
Rivals, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1122, 1133-1137 (1998).
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construction of the return on investment that would be earned by a
hypothetical firm subject to comparable risks in a competitive
environment. This consideration suggests that the partial takings
model is preferable in those circumstances where it is otherwise
acceptable to use it.
IV
RATIONALES FOR INCOMPLETE COMPENSATION
American just compensation law raises a more fundamental
question about the quantum of compensation when the government
expropriates property or engages in a regulatory taking. Why does
the law opt for an impersonal measure of compensation-the fair
market value standard-that generates a relatively stingy award
relative to other possible standards, such as a restitution standard
or an indemnification standard? In other words, why does
American law insist on incomplete compensation for government
takings of property? This part considers three possible
justifications for a rule of incomplete compensation for takings:
loss spreading, maintaining efficient incentives, and the
desirability of subsidizing public goods.56 It then considers what
implications these explanations may have for establishing
compensation awards for international regulatory takings.
A. Loss Spreading
The first rationale, loss spreading, appears at first to be highly
paradoxical. How is it that incomplete compensation in an
individual case leads to a superior spreading of losses when one
views the matter from a more systemic perspective? One must
develop the argument in stages.
The first thought that springs to mind in looking for a
justification for the fair market value standard is that its
impersonality means that it can be applied at a lower cost than
either of the two rival standards (indemnification or restitution).
The fair market standard, as noted in Part II, is not really an
"objective" standard. There is no "market price" that can be
observed, and hence the value must be developed using various
imperfect valuation techniques. Yet even with all of its
56 This analysis tracks DANA & MERRILL, supra note 26, at 169-90.
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weaknesses, the market value standard is less fraught with
valuation difficulties than either value to the taker (the restitution
standard) or value to the owner (the indemnification standard)
would be.
Determining the value to the taker would be difficult, because
the takings power is often used for public projects, such as
highways, parks, or a clean environment, that have no commercial
measures of value. For example, there are usually no sales of
comparable properties devoted to such uses, nor are there likely to
be any rental values that can be capitalized. In regulatory takings
cases, the valuation problem would be even greater. Government
regulations challenged as takings are usually designed to provide
large-scale public goods, such as a clean environment. The
benefits that these programs provide are important and are highly
valued by people, but reducing those benefits to a sum of money is
a perilous enterprise.57
Determining the value to the owner would be difficult because
owners often have reasons for their attachment to their property
that are difficult to verify. If the owner of a house with a fair
market value of $100,000 says that he would not sell for anything
less than $200,000, how do we know whether this is an honest
statement of the owner's subjective attachment to the house, as
opposed to a negotiating ploy designed to obtain a higher award of
compensation? The market value standard, with its impersonal
approach, thus undoubtedly conserves on valuation costs relative
to the indemnification standard as well.
It is tempting to dismiss these savings in valuation costs as
simply a preference for general social utility at the expense of
doing full justice to individual property owners. But it is also
possible to defend incomplete compensation on loss spreading
grounds. Perhaps the most influential discussion of just
compensation in terms of loss spreading is the now-classic article
by Frank Michelman. 58  Michelman introduced the concept of
"demoralization costs," which he defined as the costs associated
57 The literature on contingent valuation of natural resources has also noted
the problems with quantifying the benefits of government regulation. See, e.g., J.
Kahneman & J. Knetch, Valuing Public Goods: The Purchase of Moral
Satisfaction, 22 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 57 (1992).
5 Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the
Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165
(1967).
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with any government action that causes property owners to
experience uncompensated losses. Such costs, he maintained,
include not only the psychological pain incurred by losers and their
sympathizers from uncompensated losses, but also the foregone
investment caused by fear of such losses on the part of property
owners more generally. 59  Michelman recognized that
demoralization costs should not be reduced to zero by
compensating for all losses. Instead, he argued, the government
should compensate only when demoralization costs exceed what
he called "settlement costs"--the costs of paying compensation
and of administering a compensation system. Both demoralization
costs and settlement costs are real costs to society-they represent
foregone resources that could be used for other purposes.
Michelman suggested that the objective should be to minimize the
costs associated with government action that impairs property
values by incurring either settlement costs or demoralization costs,
whichever is lower.60
As applied to the rules of just compensation, Michelman's
standard suggests that legal rules that lower the valuation costs of
fixing awards of compensation may be desirable because they
allow the legal system to be more generous in identifying the
circumstances in which compensation is appropriate. In other
words, if fewer resources are spent squabbling over the size of
compensation awards, settlement costs are reduced. The lower the
settlement costs, the larger the set of cases in which it makes sense,
on social utility grounds, to alleviate demoralization costs by
paying compensation.
From this perspective, it is not implausible that property
owners as a class would agree ex ante to give up a more finely-
tuned measure of compensation in return for a broader or more
certain guarantee of compensation. In other words, before they
know whether or not their property will be taken, owners would
prefer a broad but incomplete promise of compensation to a
promise of full compensation that applies more selectively. This
intuition is consistent with what we observe in programs like
worker's compensation, which typically provide for caps on
damages in return for greater coverage against workplace injury.
It is also consistent with what we observe in the practices of the
" Id. at 1214.
60 Id. at 1215.
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insurance industry in areas such as disability insurance, where
policies typically pay benefits that fall short of full indemnity but
also do not require absolute proof of disability.
B. Maintaining Efficient Incentives
The theory that compensation is required in order to force the
government to internalize the costs of takings of property may also
justify incomplete compensation.61  Takings entail not only
demoralization costs, but also opportunity costs, in that once the
government takes property, it cannot be put to any alternative
private use. By requiring the government to pay compensation for
assets taken, the argument goes, government officials are forced to
compare the value of the resource in government hands to its value
in private hands. In theory, officials will go forward with the
taking only if they anticipate that the resource will produce greater
value as part of the government project than the compensation the
government must pay to obtain it. If the government is not
required to pay compensation for takings, government officials
may suffer from the "fiscal illusion" that the resources it takes
have no opportunity cost. As a result, they may engage in
excessive takings of property, resulting in a misallocation of
resources.
62
Standing alone, the fiscal illusion argument suggests the need
for a rule of complete compensation, such as full indemnification.
Otherwise, the government will have imperfect incentives to
compare the opportunity costs of a taking with the value of the
property in the hands of the government. But the fiscal illusion
theory is vulnerable to the objection that the cost-internalization
story operates in two directions.63  Not only do we want
government officials to have efficient incentives to regulate, we
also want private parties to have efficient incentives to desist from
activity that warrants regulation. If all declines in property values
61 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 64 (5th ed. 1998);
Jack L. Knetsch & Thomas E. Borcherding, Expropriation of Private Property
and the Basis for Compensation, 29 U. TORONTO L.J. 237, 242-244 (1979).
62 See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in
the Law of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997, 999 (1999).
63 See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV.
L. REV. 509, 528-32 (1986); see generally Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of
Land: When Should Compensation be Paid?, 99 Q. J. ECON. 71 (1984)
(discussing the economic efficiency of compensation for takings under different
sets of assumptions).
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associated with government regulation result in compensation,
then the deterrent Offect to engaging in activity subject to
government regulation will be eliminated.64 For example, if the
.government must compensate the owner of a factory shut down for
polluting, this obviously undermines the incentive effects of rules
prohibiting pollution. Assuming that much, if not most, regulated
activity has a negative net social value, compensating for
regulatory losses would create perverse incentives to engage in
antisocial behavior.
As this objection reveals, the concern about fiscal illusion is
simply a species of a more general concern about limiting behavior
that imposes external costs on others. Once we see that this is the
case, the fiscal illusion argument becomes vastly more
complicated. It is desirable to create incentives for the government
to behave efficiently, but it is also desirable to create incentives for
private parties to behave efficiently. Adopting a regime of cost-
internalization for the government will undermine cost-
internalization by private parties; conversely, adopting a regime of
cost-internalization for private parties sacrifices cost-
internalization by the government. These two objectives tend to
conflict: requiring the government fully to internalize all costs of
takings would provide no incentives to property owners, but
requiring property owners fully to internalize the costs of using
their property in ways inconsistent with future government takings
(that is, denying all compensation) would provide no incentive to
the government.
One possible solution to this dilemma is to require the
government to pay incomplete compensation when it takes
property and to leave the balance of the costs on the owner. This
provides an incentive, albeit an imperfect one, for the government
to consider the costs of taking property. It also provides some
incentive for property owners to avoid improvident investments
that increase the costs of takings and to minimize the consequential
damages associated with takings.65 Incomplete compensation, in
this sense, works something like a rule of comparative negligence
in tort or like deductibles and co-payment requirements in
64 See Kaplow, supra note 63, at 531.
65 Many consequential damages associated with condemnation, such as
moving expenses, are subject to the control of the owner, at least in part. A rule
of full indemnification would almost certainly increase these costs.
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insurance contracts. These rules, like the market value standard of
just compensation, provide incentives for the claimant to take
precautions to minimize the costs of events that give rise to
monetary liability for someone else.
C. Subsidizing Public Goods
A third reason for providing incomplete compensation is to
subsidize takings of property. There is a tendency to think of
takings as bad things, like suppressions of free speech or
unreasonable searches and seizures. But the United States
Constitution does not prohibit takings; it only prohibits takings
without just compensation. 66 The Constitution also assumes that
takings will occur in the pursuit of "public uses. 67 Most public
uses-such as the construction of highways and other
infrastructure investments, the development of parks and
recreation areas, and the protection of the environment-provide
important benefits to the public. Subsidies are good when they
produce public benefits that exceed their costs. This describes
many, if not most, of the public uses associated with the takings
power-enough that including a measure of subsidy in the
computation of just compensation may be warranted.
The point here is really just the inverse of the analysis in the
previous subsection about the internalization of external costs. All
else being equal, the government should internalize the negative
externalities that it imposes on regulated firms, and regulated firms
should internalize the negative externalities that they impose on
the government (or on society at large). By the same token,
however, both the government and regulated firms should be
encouraged to create and impose positive externalities on others.
The classic way to do this is by subsidizing activity that generates
positive externalities or public goods.
Limiting awards of compensation to fair market value, in
effect, confers a subsidy on those who exercise the power of
eminent domain or who exercise the power to impose regulations
designed to protect the public interest. If awards of just
compensation were enhanced to reflect a restitution standard or an
indemnification standard, the subsidy element would be reduced or
would disappear altogether. This would reduce the incentive of
66 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
67 Id.
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the state to use these powers to achieve ends in the public interest.
D. Implications for International Regulatory Takings
Do the rationales for incomplete compensation, developed in
the context of domestic takings in the United States, apply to
international takings? In a broad sense, it seems that they surely
do. This is especially true if the inquiry is confined to
international regulatory takings. If one were considering only
outright expropriation of property owned by. foreign nationals, as
occurred, for example, in Cuba after the communist takeover in the
late 1950s, then the case for something closer to a rule of full
indemnification or restitution would be plausible. This kind of
confiscation of property from political outsiders seems little
different than theft and presumably deserves strong condemnation
and deterrence. If one assumes, however, that the typical
international regulatory taking claim is more like an American
regulatory takings case, in which a foreign-owned facility
complains about regulations adopted, at least ostensibly, to protect
the public interest, then the various rationales for incomplete
compensation would seem to be fully applicable.68
Consider, first, the loss spreading rationale. Foreign investors
considering the risks of regulatory takings would almost certainly
prefer a rule of broad coverage with incomplete compensation to a
rule of spotty coverage and full compensation. This is the kind of
tradeoff they get with foreign overseas investment insurance, 69 and
the same balance of considerations presumably applies under a
legal regime enforced by international arbitration.
Cost-internalization considerations also support incomplete
compensation in this context. Regulatory takings may come about
because of overzealous governments or even covert attempts to
sabotage foreign investments, and these sorts of behaviors should
be discouraged. It is surely the case, however, that most
68 For an analysis of NAFTA's 'expropriation provisions in the broader
context of environmental protection concerns, see Patricia Isela Hansen, The
Interplay Between Trade and the Environment Within the NAFTA Framework, in
ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 313 (Francesco
Francioni ed., 2001).
69 For a discussion of the United States program for providing
governmentally-sponsored foreign investment insurance, see Cecil Hunt,.
Valuation Experience of Government Investment Insurance Operations, in
VALUATION VOL. 3, supra note 21, at 69.
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government regulations are motivated, at least in part, by a desire
to protect the public against a variety of environmental and other
types of harms. Foreign firms should also be discouraged from
engaging in behaviors that harm the public, and incomplete
compensation provides a degree of incentive for such firms to
avoid engaging in conduct that is likely to trigger a regulatory
response.
Finally, the subsidy rationale is applicable here. Governments
should take measures to protect public health and welfare. The
provision of this type of public good is one of the primary
responsibilities of government. Thus, even if international
obligations like NAFTA require governments to pay compensation
to firms in the event that they are subjected to regulatory takings, it
is important not to remove all incentives to regulate in the interest
of the public welfare. Just compensation in this context therefore
should be interpreted to mean incomplete compensation, that is to
say, fair market value but nothing more, in part out of a desire to
encourage governments to keep on regulating in the future.
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